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We discuss recent policy debate in Russia on moving from the present value added tax to a sales tax
structure covering households, government and exports. What is distinctive in this debate is the range
and nature of problems identified with the VAT, most of which stem from its multistage credit-invoice
mechanism. These include false credit and refund claims, delays and difficulties in obtaining legitimate
input credits and refunds reflecting responses of tax authorities to false claims, difficulties for large
firms dealing with small firms, and resulting uneven effective tax rates between energy and manufacturing
sectors. For the Russian economy being heavily dependent on oil and gas exports and seeking diversification,
the VAT effectively places industrial companies at a significant disadvantage, particularly compared
to exporters of energy resources. These problems are all intensified by the relatively high statutory
rate of 18% in the Russian VAT. 
We describe and document the debate, discussing in detail what the perceived Russian problems with
the VAT are. We suggest that many of the difficulties reflect the multi staging in the credit-invoice
mechanism in the VAT, rather than the VAT per se. We discuss the possible use of the subtraction
and addition methods in the VAT as an alternative to the sales tax proposed. We also report estimates
of possible changes in effective tax rates across sectors if the sales tax were enacted. 
The final outcome of this debate is not yet known. A special commission of the Presidential Executive
Office of the Russian Federation was to report on the matter in 2009, however, due to the economic
crisis a decision on VAT/sales tax has been postponed. Despite this, in the near future a change to
a sales tax could possibly follow. We suggest that were this to occur this would be a precedent setting
move away from the value added tax. With IMF and World Bank conditionality no longer the force
that it was for policy change in large economies such as Russia, India, China and Brazil, similar re-examinations
could follow elsewhere.
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Conventional public finance literature in the time when the value added tax evolved in its present 
form in most countries (Japan in the late 1940’s, France in the early 1950’s) stressed the formal 
equivalence between single stage sales taxes and multi stage value added taxes and advocated value 
added taxes largely on administrative grounds (see Shoup (1974)). The VAT, it was argued was self 
policing through matching invoices for buyers and sellers in intermediate transactions. Compared to a 
sales tax, VAT allowed avoiding administrative determination of what was or was not a final sale, and 
involved significant tax collection at early stages of production where small numbers of larger producers 
yielded higher compliance compared to later stages such as retailing. The VAT was adopted in France in 
1954 as a mechanism to remove cascading in the prior turn over tax through crediting of taxes on inputs, 
later became the indirect tax harmonization target for the EU in the 1960s, and then driven by World 
Bank and IMF conditionality later spread to over 120 countries
2.  
Here we discuss recent policy debate in Russia on moving back from the present value added tax 
to a sales tax structure covering households, government and exports. What is distinctive in this debate is 
the range and nature of problems identified with the VAT, most of which stem from its multistage credit-
invoice mechanism. There include false credit and refund claims delays and difficulties in obtaining 
legitimate input credits and refunds due to tax authorities reactions to false claims, difficulties for large 
firms dealing with small firms, and resulting uneven effective tax rates between energy and 
manufacturing exports. Some of these problems are known from other country experiences, and 
especially fraudulent claims for export rebates and false invoices for input credits from transient 
companies. But others are more distinctive. These include tax administration responses through onerous 
reporting and auditing requirements that effectively drive many legitimate claims to court process, and 
impose costs and delays on business that in effect cause the credit mechanism in the credit-invoice VAT 
to function extremely imperfectly. For the Russian economy being largely dependent on oil and gas 
exports, the VAT also effectively places industrial manufacturing companies at a significant disadvantage 
compared to exporters of energy resources, especially if their production processes span many 
intermediate products and supplies. These problems are all intensified by the relatively high statutory rate 
of 18% in the Russian VAT. 
A central theme of the paper is the recognition in Russia that indirect tax design in Russia inevitably 
takes place in an environment in which administrative problems unique to a multi stage tax arise when 
corrupt practises are extensive. This central feature is missing from older debate on VAT and sales taxes 
but is paramount in Russia. The central argument against the VAT is thus that a multi stage tax with 
crediting and rebating of taxes on exports seemingly inevitably creates administrative problems and 
                                                            
2 See also the discussion in Lockwood and Keen (2007)   3
provides more opportunities for corruption to flourish than is the case with a single stage sales tax.  We 
also suggest that other administrative mechanisms could be used to administer the VAT, including the 
subtraction and addition methods. The traditional problems with sales taxes – relying on tax collections 
from large numbers of small retailers and problems of defining retail sales and administering either a 
retail sales or wholesale level sales tax – in an economy such as Russia are far from easy to resolve. But 
the traditional case for the credit-invoice VAT over the sales tax emerges is much more nuanced and in 
the Russian case may not hold.  
In what follows we describe and document the debate, discussing in detail what the perceived Russian 
problems with the credit invoice VAT are. We also report estimates of possible changes in effective tax 
rate across sectors if the proposed sales tax was in effect.  The final outcome of this debate is not yet 
known. A special commission of the Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation was to 
report on the matter in 2009. However, due to the economic crisis the question of VAT/sales tax reform 
has been postponed. Despite this, in the near future a change to a sales tax could possibly follow.  
We suggest that were this to occur, this would be a precedent setting move away from the value 
added tax. With IMF and World Bank conditionality no longer the force that it was for policy change in 
large economies such as Russia, India, China and Brazil, similar re-examinations could follow elsewhere. 
Indeed, even in some OECD economies such as Canada the VAT remains an unpopular tax and some of 
the difficulties discussed in the Russian case (such as export rebates) are also present. While it is 
premature to talk about a reversal of the VAT fiscal bush fire that has swept the world in the last 50 years, 
we nonetheless suggest that this Russian debate and its new element of the credit- invoice VAT 
facilitating corrupt practices may at least be the beginnings of a questioning of the VAT’s supremacy, or 
even a partial reversal of trend.   4
 
2. The Russian VAT and Debate on Reform3  
The history of VAT in Russia begins in 1992, when a credit-invoice VAT was introduced in place 
of the Soviet style turnover tax. In 1992-2001 the basic VAT rate was 28%. In 2002-2004 it was reduced 
to 20%, and since 2004 the basic rate has remained at 18%
4. The VAT is a federal tax, and is now one of 
the major sources of federal budget revenue. The VAT contributed about 23-30% of federal budget 
revenues over the last five years. The share of VAT in budget revenues has decreased slightly over time 
(Figure 1), but is in the 30% range. In response to false claims for credits and export tax refunds, 
increasingly onerous reporting and auditing procedure have evolved. 
Since 1992, the VAT been modified by changing the list of taxable business operations, lowering 
tax rates, changing tax periods and in other ways. The VAT is now considered take one of the most 
complicated taxes in Russia, in contrast to the simple tax proposed by VAT advocates in the 1940’s 
outside of Russia. These complications have generated both large compliance costs for business and 
problems in administration for tax authorities. VAT collections have been relatively low, by international 
standards. There are estimates for 2004-2007 that only 50-60% of VAT liabilities resulted in collections
5.  
Alongside the VAT, Russia also has experience with retail sales taxes. In 1998 the sales tax was 
introduced as a regional tax with a maximum rate of 5%. The tax covered all retail transactions in cash or 
non-cash form, with the exception of basic foods, children’s clothing, housing services and other goods 
and services considered socially important. The tax rate was set by the regional authorities, and tax 
revenues were shared between regional and municipal governments. Almost all regions of Russia 
introduced a 5% sales tax
6, increasing the total indirect tax burden on consumption to 28% in 1998-2001, 
and to 25% in 2002-2003 (excise duties excluded. See Figure 1).   
                                                            
3 See also the earlier debate on flat income taxes in Russia in Ivanova et al (2005) 
4 On Value Added Tax / Law of Russian Federation # 1992-1, 06/12/91 (in Russian, with amendments); Tax Code 
of Russian Federation. Part II, Chapter 21 “Value Added Tax”, 2000 (in Russian, with amendments). 
5 See, for instance, “Concise Estimate of Economic Effects Caused by Reducing the VAT Rate (2008) / Analytical 
Center “Economax”, Moscow, 2008 (in Russian); “Collection of VAT: Structural Aspects and Decision Variants 
(2006) / Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting”, Moscow, 2006 (in Russian) 
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In 2004, the sales tax was repealed for a number of reasons. First, cancelling the sales tax was a 
part of tax simplification policy adopted in the beginning of the 2000s, reducing the number of taxes. 
Second, the tax was also viewed as difficult to administer on a local and regional level, and sales tax 
collections were also rather low. These difficulties reflected the traditional problems of sales taxes of 
collecting revenues from large numbers of small retailers, and issues with the definition of final sales. 
Since 2004 VAT has been the only tax on consumption in Russia (except excise duties for a limited 
number of goods).  
But since 2006 due to the problems listed above with VAT, there is an on-going debate on 
possible further VAT reform. Discussions on VAT reform have been held at various levels and involved 
government officials, business associations (including the Russian Union of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs) and expert groups. In 2006-2007, the most widely discussed proposal was to decrease the 
statutory VAT rate to 12-13%. The supporters of this change argued that a decrease in VAT rate would 
produce a substantial stimulating effect on the manufacturing sector and promote additional investment. 
The claim was also made that if the VAT rate was no higher than 13%, this would greatly weaken 
incentives of tax evasion, as the costs for using evasion schemes would be roughly the same as tax 
payments saved and the VAT collection rate would rise.  
The idea of decreasing the VAT rate was strongly opposed by the Ministry of Finance, who 
argued that such changes would undermine budget stability. However, there was a substantial budget 
surplus at the time (7.5% GDP in 2005, 7.4% GDP in 2006) and as a result, in 2007 President Putin in his   6
Annual Address to the Federal Assembly proposed that VAT should be reformed and probably decreased 
to the “lowest possible rate”
7.  
At the same time, an alternative direction for VAT reform – the restoration of the retail sales tax 
in place of the VAT emerged. This idea, originating with the Presidential Executive Office, was further 
developed by the Finance Academy under the Government of the Russian Federation. The idea of 
substituting the VAT with a 10% sales tax was seen by industrial manufacturers as attractive, since they 
would be little involved with final sales. In 2007 the idea of introducing a 10% retail sales tax instead of 
the VAT was formally supported by the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. However, the 
sales tax alternative was questioned by the Ministry of Finance on the basis that the idea had not been 
investigated deeply enough.  
In 2008, President Medvedev accepted that there were on-going problems with the VAT and 
encouraged further discussion of reform. The Ministry of Economic Development made preliminary 
estimates of the possible impacts of decreasing the basic VAT rate from 18% to 12%, and the Presidential 
Executive Office continued to investigate the possibility of substituting the VAT with a 10% sales tax. To 
date no final decision has been made. Discussions concerning VAT reform were scheduled for August 
2008, but were postponed due to the economic crisis. The “Key directions for tax policy for the Russian 
Federation for 2010 and the planned period of 2011-2012”
8, adopted in May 2009 by the Government, did 
not include any decisions with regard to the VAT or tax rate or sales tax.  The details of the sales tax 
mechanism to be used, such as the exact definition of final sales, the taxation of small business sales, 
transitional issues with substituting of VAT with sales tax, have not yet been spelled out. There are also 
no estimates for the impacts of sales tax VAT substitution, including cross-industry effective tax rates, 
sales tax collection rates, and potential budget revenue impacts.  
3. Discussion of VAT Issues Raised in the Debate 
The debate on VAT reform in Russia has focused on issues which have made the VAT complicated 
both for taxpayer companies and for tax authorities. Most of the issues involve the VAT credit-invoice 
mechanism, and originate with low tax discipline and corrupt practices existing in Russia and the 
responses of tax authorities to these
9. The central issues are exemptions from VAT, including refunds of 
inputs credits for exporters substantiating input credits for domestic producers, the tax treatment of small 
business units, and suppliers of some “socially important” goods and services. Taking into account the 
current structure of the Russian economy by sector, the argument is that these problems with the VAT 
produce obstacles to economic development in Russia since the effective tax rate on the manufacturing 
section is very high. The most broadly discussed issues in the debate are listed below (Table 1).  
                                                            
7 Annual Address of the President of Russian Federation to Federal Assembly. April 26, 2007.  
8 Key Directions of Tax Policy of the Russian Federation for 2010 and the planned period of 2011-2012. Approved 






















Large private compliance costs. The most widespread argument against current VAT in Russia 
is that it has created large compliance costs for taxpayer companies. These costs include the time and 
money involved to justify claims for VAT credits or refund, the denial of the legitimate claims and the 
borrowing costs of cash withdrawals by taxpayer companies waiting for refunds.  
The Russian VAT is a conventional credit invoice VAT in which a company first pays VAT to its 
suppliers and then deducts it from its own payments due for the products sold. If the input VAT, paid to 
suppliers, is greater than output VAT, a company has the right to claim a refund. As a result, many middle 
sized and large businesses have had the experience of attempting to recover input VAT or a VAT refund. 
The substantial part of VAT refund claims come from exporter companies given that exports are free 
from VAT in Russia, but claims for VAT input credits to be deducted from VAT on sales are also 
involved.  
Last year VAT administration was one of hottest issues in tax policy in Russia. This was reflected, 
for instance, in the Ernst & Young
10 series of annual surveys of Russian and multinational companies 
operating in Russia. In 2009, 57% of Ernst & Young respondents pointed out that improvements in the 
VAT regime (procedures of VAT calculation and refund) were required. Specifically, they criticized the 
sophisticated rules of VAT calculation, extensive documentary requirements, complicated and lengthy 
procedures for recovering input VAT, and delays on VAT refunds.  
Despite the Tax Code amendments in 2007-2008 which aimed to improve procedures for tax 
audits and provide clear descriptions of common tax administration procedures, companies have had to 
spend progressively more on tax issues. According to the survey of Ernst & Young, in 2009 55% of 
                                                            
10 The latest available source is 2009 Russia Tax Survey. / Ernst & Young, 2009. (in English)   8
companies had dedicated tax departments, compared to 40% of such respondents in 2008. There is a trend 
of increasing numbers of employees in dedicated tax departments. In 2009, 31% of companies had 5-10 
employees in dedicated tax departments, and 27% of companies had 11-20 employees. In comparison, in 
2007 these shares were 24% and 10%, respectively. The main reasons for enlarging these tax departments 
have been that there are significant differences between statutory accounting and tax accounting; and the 
documentation requirements are demanding. Taxpayers (especially in large companies) must submit large 
amounts of documentary support to the tax authorities if they are making a claim either for a VAT input 
credit, or a refund of taxes on exports. For instance, in 2007 representatives of the tax department of an 
automotive company complained that they had to use a large truck when submitting supporting 
documents to the local tax authority office.   
Procedures for recovering and refunding VAT, despite changes in the last 2 years made by tax 
authorities, have become even more problematic for many companies, due to the large amounts of false 
claims, VAT reimbursement procedures . According to Pepeliaev, Goltsblat & Partners
11 (one of the 
largest providers of law and consulting services in Russia), last year the most frequent reason for refusals 
in VAT recovery or refund were faults in supporting documentation, and so-called unfair counterpart 
suppliers – i.e. suppliers suspected of VAT evasion. 
According to tax consultants
12, refusals for VAT recovery or refunds are often based on minor 
faults in supporting documentation like an unclear organization stamp or an absence of full address in 
pro-forma invoices, waybills, acceptance reports, etc. Last years a growing number of input VAT claims 
were not meet on the grounds that there were tax evaders among the suppliers of a company. Tax 
consultants reported that in some cases these tax evading companies belong to third and even fifth tier 
suppliers, i.e. were not directly involved in the business with the company claiming VAT input recovery. 
Such problems resulted in a further increase in documentation collected from suppliers, aiming to prove 
their tax compliance.  
The time period for obtaining VAT refunds has shortened, but still remains at 3-4 months and 
more. According to a survey by Ernst & Young, only 15% of respondents in 2009 received VAT refunds 
in less than 3 months, 63% of respondents received a refund in 3-4 months, and 15% - in a time period of 
between 4 months and a year. In comparison, in 2008 the periods for VAT refunds were much longer: 
42% got a refund in 3-4 months, and 40% in 4-12 months. This improvement is caused mainly by 
changing the tax period for VAT (from a month to 3 months for all categories of taxpayers), which 
automatically decreases the number of claims for the VAT return.  
A further key element of taxpayer costs in that a significant part of VAT refunds are only made 
after court decisions. For instance, the Federal Taxation Service of the Ministry of Finance of Russia 
reported that in the first half of 2008 the tax authorities declined VAT refunds for a total sum of 78 bln 
rubles (about $3.3bln). However, in this period the courts approved VAT refunds for a total sum of 30 bln 




90% of their VAT refunds. However, VAT issues remain the most frequent tax issues disputed in the 
courts. In 2007-2009 VAT cases were almost half the disputed tax cases, and in more than 70% of cases 
companies were involved in tax disputes with tax authorities.  
Not only are VAT reimbursements uncertain in many cases, but companies claiming refunds also 
bear a risk of extra payments of VAT due and fines. Business associations have reported
13 that some 
companies have adopted simple risk-averse tax practices: such as not claiming for VAT input credits. 
This intensifies the problems and increases further the interests costs of cash withdrawals needed for 
advance tax payments and the lengthy delays for VAT refunds.  Such cash withdrawals are substantial for 
certain sectors. A 2006 study of Russia’s automotive industry showed that VAT payments can constitute 
up to 50% of the total tax burden of some companies
14. 
In 2007-2008 many taxpayer companies complained of their experience with these administrative 
pressures. The largest pressure was taxpayers who are involved in all stages of tax dispute – from initial 
refund claims to the court decisions. In this situation, VAT evaders who do not need to deal with this 
administrative pressure, receive a competitive advantage over the lawful taxpayers.  
Differential Impacts of VAT by sector. One of the most important arguments against the 
current VAT is that it produces an unequal tax burden across sectors and this impedes economic 
performance through distortions
15. The major part of Russian exports of raw materials (with crude oil and 
gas the largest), and production of raw materials is mostly export-oriented and involves few intermediate 
products. In contrast, the major portion of higher value-added goods is for the internal market.  
Below we illustrate this economic structure using two industries: machinery and equipment 
(which corresponds to ISIC 382-384
16) and crude petroleum and natural gas (ISIC 220) (Table 2). As a 
rule, companies in machinery and equipment produce higher value added goods than companies 
extracting crude oil and gas. They also create substantial employment. According to Rosstat data, in 2008 
employment in machinery and equipment production in Russia was 4.4 times higher than in crude 
petroleum and natural gas production. In addition, companies in manufacturing and equipment production 
usually have higher investment activity than in oil and gas extraction companies. Estimates based on 
Rosstat data show that in 2008 the capital investment to profit ratio for machinery and equipment was 1.7 









In contrast to crude petroleum and natural gas, where about 50% of petroleum and 28% of natural 
gas is exported, more than 80% of produced machinery and equipment goes to the internal market. This 
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To illustrate the disproportionate industry VAT burdens, we have used the latest available 
statistics (first half of 2009) provided by the Federal Taxation Service of Russia (Figure 2). We use a 
comparison with profits to illustrate the relative amounts of cash withdrawals caused by VAT payments 
with difficulty over VAT inputs credits.  
Implicitly this assumes the VAT is borne by the entity paying the tax, i.e. the company, and the 
tax is not shifted forward to consumers. As such, we focus on effective tax rates relative to profits. For the 
mining industry in general, in the 1
st half of 2009 it needed to withdraw cash equal to about 6% of their 
profits to pay VAT, whereas for manufacturing industries the relative withdrawal was much higher, 
reaching 37% on average. However, for the companies manufacturing higher value added goods, this 
proportion was even greater. For companies producing electrical machinery and equipment, VAT 
payments are 57% of profits, and for other machinery production – more than 60% of profits. It is worth 
noting that this inequality in VAT payments was also present in prior years, before the economic crisis. 
For example, according to the Federal Taxation Service, in 2007 VAT payments by the crude petroleum 
                                                            
17 In physical volumes.    11
and natural gas industry were around 20% of profits, and in machinery and equipment – about 55%. The 
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The higher VAT burden on manufacturing companies requires larger cash withdrawals and result 
in sharply lower funds for investment. It thus retards development of Russia’s manufacturing sector. In 
this sense it can be argued, that VAT preserves the commodity specialization of Russian economy and 
does not promote its diversification into manufacturing.  
 
Problems for producers dealing with small tax exempt suppliers. Another issue with Russian’s 
current VAT arises with small and medium sized enterprises. The Russian Tax Code provides a VAT 
exemption for small business units (organizations or individual entrepreneurs) with less than 2 mln rubles 
(approximately $70 000) revenues over the last 12 months
18. Small business units with less than 45 mln 
rubles (about $1.6 mln) annual revenue can also apply for treatment under a simplified taxation system
19, 
under which a business unit receives a tax exemption for a number of taxes (including VAT) and pays a 
single tax on corporate income instead of them. These measures were a part of an earlier tax stimulus 
package for small businesses. In many cases these VAT exemptions are a discouraging factor for 
transactions between small tax exempt suppliers and larger taxable companies, since there are no input 
credits.  
This can be illustrated using the example of small tax exempt business units supplying goods to 
taxable retailers. If a retailer’s supplier is a taxable company, the retailer would pay VAT and recover this 
VAT at the end of tax period as an input credit. But if a retailer’s supplier is a tax exempt company or 




exempt supplier would provide his or her products for the price reduced by the amount of VAT. But, in 
practice the prices of small suppliers are not cheaper than those of larger suppliers , given differences in 
production scale, operations management, and other factors. For these reasons, a common practice for 
retailers (and of many other large companies as well) is to deal preferentially with VAT taxpayers rather 
than with tax exempt business units.  
As a matter of fact, the largest part of small business units (according to national statistical 
definitions an enterprise with annual revenues less than 400 mln rubles (about $14 mln) and less 100 
employees) operate in retail and wholesale trade. According to Rosstat data, the share of small business 
units operating in retail and wholesale trade was 45% in 2005-2007. In contrast, the share of small 
businesses operating in manufacturing was 11-12%.  
 
Compliance issues with the VAT for tax authorities 
In recent years, the most important VAT issue for tax authorities in Russia has been the rapid 
growth of claims for VAT refunds, many of which are fraudulent. In 2002 the Federal Customs Service of 
the Russian Federation admitted that VAT refund claims on false operations were one of the main threats 
to Russia’s economic security. According to the report of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian 
Federation, in 2002-2006 the amounts of output VAT increased 2.8 times, but the amounts of input VAT 
increased by 3 fold
20. The Accounts Chamber also estimated that growth rates of VAT refunds were far 
ahead of GDP growth. In 2004 nominal GDP increased by 26.5% compared to 2003. At the same time 
input VAT claims (excluding export refunds) increased to 35.5%, and VAT refund claims on exports – by 
45.3%. In 2005 the annual budget losses incurred by false VAT claims were $4.7 bln. The Center for 
Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (CMASF) estimated in 2006 that if the VAT 
refunds continued to grow at the same rate as in 2006, by 2013 refunds would be greater than VAT 
revenues
21.  
At the same time, the VAT collection rate remained unsatisfactory. Estimates from researchers
22 
show that VAT collections were less than 60% of VAT liabilities in 2000s. These estimates are based on 
average payment and statutory tax rates. The estimates of the Ministry of Finance are higher: 80-90% in 
2005-2007 and about 85% in the first half of 2009. However, these estimates differ in that researchers use 
a comparison between expected VAT revenues and actual revenues. Despite these differences, improving 







Center “Economax”, Moscow, 2008 (in Russian); “Collection of VAT: Structural Aspects and Decision Variants 
(2006) / Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting”, Moscow, 2006 (in Russian)   13
Since 2005 the tax authorities have made a number of administrative efforts aimed to improve tax 
discipline and prevent the growth of false VAT claims. The Federal Taxation Service and the Ministry of 
Finance suggested a number of directions, including the introduction of special “VAT accounts” for 
taxpayer companies, with preliminary registration of VAT taxpayers. Such initiatives were discussed but 
not adopted by the Government.  
The more substantial part of tax effort relates to expanding the regulatory authority of the Federal 
Taxation Service. This includes extensive tax audits and additional checks before approving VAT refunds, 
imposing additional requirements for supporting documents and taxpayers applying for refunds. 
According to the media, at that time the Federal Taxation Service recommended its regional and local 
subsidiaries to increase significantly the number of refusals for VAT refunds. The Federal Taxation 
Service also carried out an extensive project developing criteria for “unreliable” companies which should 
be checked more carefully if they applied for a VAT refund. The policy was intended to complicate the 
process of VAT reimbursement. As a result, as discussed above, the time periods required for obtaining 
VAT refunds became longer, and the major part of VAT refund claims were fulfilled only after court 
disputes. The growth rate for VAT refunds was lowered, but the public costs of VAT compliance 
increased significantly.  
Since 2007, a number of amendments to the Tax Code of Russian Federation have been adopted, 
setting limits for tax audits, terms of VAT refunds, etc. A special procedure for “fast” VAT refunds for 
large taxpayers (with tax payments exceeding 10 bln rubles (about $360 mln) for the last 3 years) is under 
development. Nevertheless, VAT administration remains one of the most difficult tax areas and still 
requires further improvement.  
Fundamentally, then, all three of these problem areas – problems in the processing of claims for 
VAT credits or refunds by business, the interaction of large and small firms, and rising compliance costs 
for government from fraudulent claims for credits – stem from the multi stage nature of the credit-invoice 
VAT in an economy with major problems with corrupt practice. The central argument this creates for the 
sales tax is the easing of these problems by moving to a single stage tax.    14
4. The sales tax alternative  
To date, the most detailed description and discussion of the sales tax alternative to the VAT in 
Russia is presented in a report by the Center for Taxation Problem Research (CTPR)
23. This Centre is 
closely connected to the Finance Academy under the Government of the Russian Federation. The report 
summarizes the results of a project carried out with the support of the Presidential Executive Office. From 
the end of 2006 on this report was publicly discussed by the expert community, business associations and 
government officials. As we noted above, after these discussions the Presidential Executive Office was to 
develop the idea furthermore. However, to date no other reports on the matter are available, but a 
Presidential Commission created in 2008 on the issue still exists and is to report.  
The sales tax suggested by CTPR is a somewhat unusual variant on a conventional retail sales tax. 
It is a single stage 10% tax on all final consumption including household consumption, government 
consumption and exports. Transactions between companies are subject to the sales tax if a transaction was 
either made in cash or the costs of the transaction do not qualify as production costs.  As such the 
government taxes itself, and both imports and exports are taxed. The idea is to generate as large a base as 
possible for a single stage tax to have as low a rate as possible, and that all legal entities should be 
taxpayers, with intermediate sales free from the sales tax through a tax payer qualification scheme. The 
resulting discussion of the CTPR proposal has focused on a variety of potential benefits and risks of VAT 
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The replacement of VAT by a sales tax in Russia is claimed to be beneficial for business as it 
would lower tax compliance costs and generate positive structural effects in the economy. In addition, it is 
argued that substitution of VAT by a 10% sales tax would automatically make the most popular tax 
evasion schemes less attractive. Also, the revenues from the sales tax can be better planned by regional 
governments, given population density and other characteristics.  
The use of a sales tax instead of the VAT would contribute in a major way to a decrease in tax 
compliance costs for many companies. As noted above, the VAT is one of the most complicated taxes in 
Russia, imposing high costs for tax accounting, and requiring the supporting documents and participating 
in tax disputes if necessary. Compared to VAT, the proposed sales tax is more easily calculated, and 
given that it does not imply any reimbursements, there is no need for administrative procedures for 
refunds approval and checking the supporting documents. The removal of multi staging in the tax is thus 
one of its main advantages over VAT.   
The substitution of VAT with a sales tax would also greatly simplify tax administration for tax 
authorities. This is because the proposed sales tax is simpler than VAT, and the relatively low sales tax 
rate of 10% will create less incentive for tax evasion. According to independent estimates
24, in the recent 
years in Russia the costs of popular tax evasion schemes used for VAT are in the range of 12-13% of the 
value of sales. Currently, with a 18% VAT, taxpayers finds it pays to use such schemes and bear the risk 
of legal liability. The consensus view is a 10% tax rate
25  would automatically make such schemes 
unattractive.  
Another important benefit of substitution of VAT by a  sales tax is induced structural change in 
the economy. In contrast to a VAT, which places the manufacturing sector under a much higher tax 
burden than the export oriented mining sector, the sales tax would offset this and depending on tax 
shifting assumptions do the opposite. In this sense, the sales tax can be viewed as a stimulus to economic 
diversification in Russia.  
This effect is illustrated in the CTPR report
26, where 5 types of business units were taken for 
comparison: oil and gas exporting companies, wholesale trading companies, retail trading companies, 
companies operating in the B2B sector, and service suppliers for individual customers. Simple estimates 
provided in the report showed that the sectoral sales tax burden is sharply different than that of VAT 






that companies bear the tax on retail sales the effective tax burden on sales for all 5 model companies 
decreases (Table 4). However, the largest decrease, according to the CTPR calculations, is for the 
industrial supplier company (B2B supplier) and the wholesale trader company (15 and 11 percentage 
points, respectively). The tax burden for oil and gas exporters decreases only to 1 percentage point, and 







Oil & gas exporting company  2%  1%  1 
Wholesale trading company  11%  0%  11 








These CTRP estimates thus indicate probable shifts in tax burdens across the various sectors of 
the Russian economy. However, as there are estimates are only for model companies, they do not provide 
the complete cross-industry macroeconomic picture of sales tax burdens.  
We have also made an attempt to obtain such a picture, aiming to understand more fully the 
differences in the indirect tax burden in case of a VAT substitution with a sales tax based on the latest 
available input-output tables for Russian economy (2003 data published in 2006). However, the 
substantial lag in data presented in input-output tables imposes a number of limitations. First, the latest 
input-output tables for Russia are based on 2003 data and they use an industry classification which was 
used in Russia before 2005 and does not comply with the International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC). Second, for the comparison between VAT and sales tax we use a 20% statutory VAT rate which 
was in effect in 2003, and a 5% sales tax which was charged on a limited number of consumer goods. For 
this reason, our estimates describe the situation as if a 20% VAT was substituted with a 10% sales tax (in 
addition to the existing sales tax of 5%). This assumption permits us to ignore the low sales tax collection 
rate in 2003 and the limited range of consumer goods covered by the tax.  
Following the sales tax proposed in the CTPR report, we define the sales tax base for each sector 
of the economy as the sum of domestic final sales to households, government, non-profit organizations, 
and exports. All data are taken from the input-output tables based on 2003, and we exclude VAT from 
domestic prices, so as to compare the tax burden distribution of VAT against sales tax. We also assume 
no out-of-pocket transactions between legal bodies, no tax allowances and no tax evasion. For comparison, 
we also estimate the cross-industry VAT burdens using the same input-output data. However, these data   17
have limitations. The aggregate data do not permit us to distinguish between large business units and 
medium businesses, which in case of low turnover could be VAT exempt. This is important especially for 
such sectors as retail and wholesale trade where a substantial amount of trade is carried out by such 
businesses. For this reason, we do not make estimates of the VAT burden for these industries having a 
relatively large proportion of small and medium businesses (like the wholesale and retail trade sector), 
and for industries which are free or almost free from VAT (financial services, healthcare services). As a 
result, our comparison covers only about 55% of Russian GDP. We also do not take into account VAT 
exemptions provided for some final goods and VAT deductions for fixed capital investments. In other 
words, we take into account only the input VAT deduction (including export rebates) and lower VAT 
rates for some industries (foods, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, etc). For simplicity, we also do not estimate 
the indirect tax burden on imports (assuming that the substitution of VAT with sales tax would not 
produce significant changes in import volume and structure). Finally, we calculate the ratio of estimated 
VAT or sales tax payments to industry output, to make our tax burden comparisons easier to follow.  
The results show substantial differences in sales tax effective rates compared to VAT (Figure 3). 
The estimates of VAT burden by sector are in line with the observations from macroeconomic statistics –  
sectors with high value added are exposed to a higher VAT burdens than commodity producing sectors. 
For instance, most of the VAT burden falls on industries with high value added – production of 
construction materials (the ratio of VAT to industry output is about 10%), production of machinery and 
equipment (8.8%), power industry (7.1%). The sectors involved in commodity exports, as expected, 
experience much lower effective VAT rates (for oil production industry, the ratio of VAT to industry 
output is 2.8%, and for metallurgy it is 2.2%).  
Figure 3. Comparison of VAT and sales tax effective rates across industries in Russia 





























































































































































































































































































































* Industries not subject to VAT
 
Source: ICSS calculations based on Russian Input-Output Tables, 2003 
Estimates of sales tax under the same conditions show a different picture and in general, the 
results are in line with CTPR results discussed above. The highest effective sales tax rate is for industries 
and sectors with relatively high shares of final sales in total industry output. Apart from retail and   18
wholesale trade, sectors with high share of final sales are education, healthcare and recreation services 
(the estimated ratio of sales tax to sector output is 8.6%), financial and insurance services (7.0%), food 
industry (6.0%).  
Unlikely CTPR model company estimates, commodity exporting sectors experience higher 
indirect tax rates, under of sales tax introduction. The reason is that the export revenues for these sectors 
are higher than domestic intermediate sales (which are free of sales tax). For some sub-industries, which 
received the net VAT refunds on exports (i.e. negative values of VAT payments), the introduction of sales 
tax would also cause on increase in tax rates. A relatively high sales tax rates occurs for oil production 
(ratio of sales tax to industry output is 6.4%) and gas production (5.0%). 
At the same time, for the sectors involved mostly in B2B operations with large intermediate sales, 
the sales tax burden is estimated to be low (0.9% sales tax to sector output ratio for construction materials 
production, 1.1% for power industry, 2.7% for machinery and equipment production). Thus, the 
introduction of sales tax instead of VAT substantially changes the pattern of cross-sector effective indirect 
tax rates.  
Apart from stimulating structural diversification, the sales tax also has the potential advantage of 
better tax planning across regions. The regional distribution of sales tax revenues are expected to 
correspond closely with population density. Compared to the VAT, where the regional distribution of tax 
revenues depends on the spatial location of value chains, it is thus easier to estimate sales tax revenues, 
optimize inter-budget transfers and maintain budget stability ate a local and regional level. 
 
Potential risks of sales tax  
Despite the benefits above, the opponents of sales taxes in Russia point to the potential risks of 
VAT substitution. The most serious is budget losses because for many companies the tax burden would 
be lowered. There are also concerns about the definition of final and intermediate sales, which is closely 
connected to the size of tax base and opportunities of sales tax evasion. In addition, problems of double 
taxation of exports and small business taxation arise.  
Probable budget losses are viewed as the most serious argument against a 10% sales tax. It is 
worth noting that the issue of budget stability during tax reform was important in Russia even in pre-crisis 
times when the federal budget had a surplus for almost ten years. According to the CTPR estimates
27, the 
introduction of this tax instead of VAT could cause a decline in budget revenues of 2.3% of GDP during 
the first year (these estimates were made on the basis of 2004 data, assuming that there were no changes 
in tax collection rates for the various sectors of the economy).  
Most of the losses are expected because the structure of taxpayers would be changed. In contrast 
to VAT, where tax is collected throughout the whole value chain, in case of sales tax the taxpayer is on 
the final end of the value chain (in most cases – in retail). However, retail trade has low tax discipline. For 
example, in 2004-2006 it was estimated that VAT collection in retail (excluding the VAT exempts) was 
                                                            
27 Comparison of VAT and Sales Tax / Center for Taxation Problem Research, Moscow, 2006 (in Russian).   19
2-3 times below the average VAT collection rate in Russia
28. Consequently, the introduction of sales tax 
alternative requires a decision about how to compensate for missing revenues, and how to improve the tax 
collection rate in the retail sector. According to the CTPR calculations, if the tax collection rate in retail 
sector is improved to the average values for Russian economy, expected budget losses would fall from 
2.3% GDP to 1.2% GDP. Moreover, these losses are to be compensated in the following years by the 
strong stimulus effect on the industrial sector of the economy. One of the probable solutions for 
compensating budget revenues suggested by CTPR was to make a step-by-step substitution of the VAT 
with sales tax over several years. The idea is to decrease VAT rate gradually and simultaneously increase 
sales tax rates. However, this raises the questions of added tax administration and tax compliance costs, 
given that there would be two indirect taxes instead of one.  
Another potential issue with sales taxes arises with the definition of final and intermediate sales. 
Currently the proposal is to define the sales tax base as all final sales (i.e. household consumption, 
government purchases, exports, and purchases paid in cash). However this has to be defined more 
precisely to prevent tax evasion. The use of registration numbers for purchasers of intermediate products 
is another option. To date, these definitions are not elaborated yet.  
Opponents of sales tax point out to examples of regional sales taxes which existed in Russia in 
1998-2003, where the problem of distinguishing between intermediate and final sales was major. For 
example, as the former sales tax was imposed on sales with cash payments, the popular forms of tax 
evasion were false non-cash payments and reconfiguration of cash registers. This led to low tax collection 
rates and eventually repeal of the sales tax. The proposed sales tax is thus unlikely to be as easy to 
administer in practice as it seems in theory.  
In its current form, the proposed sales tax would also create a problem of double taxation of 
exports. The major part of Russian exports goes to EU, where they are subject to VAT. Since no export 
rebates are planned with the sales tax, exported Russian goods (including industrial exports) would be 
less competitive. Estimates made using the 2003 input-output tables show that if exports are excluded 
from the sales tax base, this would lead to more than a 40% decline in sales tax revenues.  
The possible introduction of a sales tax in Russia also raises questions for small and medium size 
business. To date, about 50% of small and medium size enterprises operate in the retail sector, which 
potentially is the core taxpayer of sales tax. To date, as discussed above, the small and medium size 
business units are taking advantage of a special tax regime and are not subject to VAT. If the proposed 
sales tax were to be imposed on small and medium business units as well, that would certainly increase 
their tax burdens and decrease their competitiveness. At the same time, if the sales of small and medium 
size business were exempted from sales tax, tax revenues from the retail sector would fall sharply.  
Alternatives to the sales tax 
  Although not discussed in the debate, there are other options to the continuation of the present 




invoice mechanism used to administer the VAT, or from taxing value added. As long ago emphasized by 
Shong (1974) there are three different methods of computation which can be used for value added, which 
lead to three different administrative mechanisms for the VAT. One is the multi staged credit invoice 
mechanism in current use (and widely used around the world). The two others are the subtraction method 
of directly taxing the difference between total sales and input costs at firm level, and the addition method 
of directly taxing wage compensation and capital income (profits plus interest paid) at firm level. With 
the latter two methods, no multi staging is involved. There are definitional problems with each, and 
neither has widespread use on which to draw experience but given the collection problems with the sales 
tax, are alternative options.    
To sum up the arguments above in favor of and against the substitution of VAT with a sales tax 
suggest that compared to the VAT, the sales tax is also advantageous because of its simpler tax 
administration, which reduces tax compliance and collective costs. The sales tax is also potentially 
appealing for the development of high value added manufacturing and services. An important advantage 
of this change is a positive structural effect on the Russian economy, fostering its diversification through 
the development of manufacturing companies operating in B2B sector. However, the introduction of sales 
tax would require additional efforts and decisions on political and regulatory level in the field of budget 
revenues compensation, and neutralization of potential negative effects on exporters and small business 




Finally, we note that this debate in Russia on the possible replacement of the value added tax by a 
sales tax has to be seen relative both to the history of the VAT and its global spread throughout the 
economies of the world. Since its introduction in France in 1954, the VAT has spread, first as a common 
harmonization instrument for a tax union in the EU as a common European tax and then through 
developing countries and World Bank and IMF conditionality, and finally to many other economies 
around the world including other OECD economies besides the EU such as Canada, New Zealand and 
others as the goods and services tax (equivalent to VAT). The attractions of the VAT have always been 
seen as its broad base and its compliance advantages since there is no need to define a retail sale as a final 
sale since the tax is ultimately paid by those who have no inputs to claim as final users. It has always been 
advocated also that the tax was attractive because of its self policing properties, namely the issuance of 
invoices by sellers which have to be matched by invoices claimed by buyers. 
However, despite all these advantages, the reality of the VAT in most countries has been more 
mixed than the claimed advantages in the 1950s. Many European countries such as France had difficulties 
with bogus companies established to print VAT invoices which disappeared in a matter of days or months. 
This has been an ongoing problem of tax administration. Equally, bogus or false claims for export refunds 
have been an issue in many countries. Thus, the administrative advantages claimed for the VAT, in 
practice have with them administrative difficulties. And also, in practice, the matching of invoices 
precisely between buyers and sellers does not usually occur because of the volumes of invoices which are 
involved. 
This Russian debate however places the VAT in a different light, when one is dealing with 
economies in which there are significant difficulties of corruption and compliance. In the Russian case, 
effectively, the VAT has become close to a cascading turn-over tax because of bogus invoices, fraudulent 
rebate claims, and the associated difficulties of obtaining refunds. These, in turn, have generated a 
response at an administrative level which has imposed large compliance costs and documentary burdens 
on legitimate tax payers. This has reached the point almost where input credits and export refunds are 
often awarded by courts. As we document above, the net effect has been large increases in the tax burden 
for manufacturing industries which are engaged in intermediate transactions compared to export resources 
industries and services. While seemingly an obvious set of difficulties for the VAT, as they have taken to 
perhaps been taken the extreme in the Russian case. The surprising element is that this set of problems 
has not centrally entered global debate on the VAT, which continues to be strongly advocated by 
international agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
The Russian debate therefore is in part a mirror image of the debate which preceded the VAT in 
many other countries, where the pre-existing taxes were characterized as ineffective and riddled with 
compliance problems, while the VAT, yet to be introduced, was portrayed as a clean tax, free of many of 
these difficulties. This was true for instance in the Canadian case with the introduction of the GST, where 
the preexisting manufacturing sales tax was claimed to have problems of cascading difficulties of   22
definition of final sale, tax exporting through increased input taxes effectively appearing as part of export 
costs, and other difficulties. The VAT, in turn, was proposed as a way of resolving all of these problems 
without recognizing other administrative problems to follow. 
In the Russian case, the VAT which has operated since 1992 has encountered these difficulties in 
ways which are perhaps extreme, but they highlight the also major administrative issues involved. It is not 
that the sales tax is necessarily a preferred option since the tax compliance costs involved in collecting 
taxes at the retail stage are well known and, in the Russian case, are major, and particularly if large 
numbers of small retailers operate. An argument made in the 1950s in France was that collecting 
significant amounts of tax at the early stages of the production process from a small number of large 
entities was more effective than attempting to collect tax from large numbers of small retail outlets at 
final stage. Nonetheless, the tax compounding effects which operate against the Russian manufacturing 
industries emphasize all of these difficulties, and the compliance and collection problems appear to be 
mounting. 
The global implications therefore of this Russian debate seem fairly clear. The VAT is coming 
under challenge because of its major administrative problems which follow directly from its multi-stage 
character. These in turn are leading to arguments in favor of the introduction of a sales tax in place of the 
VAT. To our knowledge, this is the first case where such a debate has taken place in this form, and if it 
results in the replacement of the VAT in this way, it will be an unnerving precedent for the VAT and its 
global domination. It is not that the VAT is suddenly going to disappear from the global landscape, but 
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